Agricultural extension - generic challenges and the ingredients for solutions by Feder, Gershon et al.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2129
Agricultural Extension  The agriculture  sector  musL
nearly double biological yields
on existing farmiand to meet
Generic  Challenges  and Some  food needs, which will
Ingredients for Solutions  double  in the next  quarter
century. A sustainable
Gershon Feder  approach  to providing
Anthony Willett  agricultural  extension  services
in developing countries-
Willem Zijp
minimal external Inputs, a
systems  orientation, pluralism,
and arrangements  that take
advantage of the best
incentives  for farmers  and
extension  service  providers  --
will release  the local
knowledge, resources,
common sense,  and























































































































dPoLic-Y  REsEARCH  WtORKI-NG  PAPER  2129
Summary  findings
Is agricultural  extension  in developing  countries  up to  Liability  for  public  service  functions  beyond  the
the  task  of providing  the  information,  ideas,  and  transfer  of agricultural  knowledge  and  information.
organization  needed  to meet  food  needs?  What  role  *  Fiscal  sustainability.
should  governments  play  in implementing  or  facilitating  *  Inadequate  interaction  with  knowledge  generators.
extension  services?  Feder,  Willett,  and Zijp  show  how  various  extension
Roughly  80 percent  of the  wvorld's extension  is  approaches  were  developed  in attempts  to overcome  the
publicly  funded  and  delivered  by civil servants,  providing  challenges  of extension:
a range  of services  to the  farming  population,  - Improving  extension  management.
commercial  producers,  and  disadvantaged  target  groups.  - Decentralizing.
Budgetary  constraints  and  concerns  about  performance  '  Focusing  on single  commodities.
create  pressure  to show  the  payoff  on investment  in  *  Providing  fee-for-service  public  extension  services.
extension  and  to explore  alternatives  to publicly  *  Establishing  institutional  pluralism.
providing  it.  *  Empowering  people  by using  participatory
Feder,  Willett,  and  Zijp  analyze  the  challenges  facing  approaches.
policymakers  who  must  decide  what  role  governments  Using appropriate  media.
should  play  in implementing  or  facilitating  extension  Each  of the approaches  has weaknesses  and  strengths,
services.  Focusing  on  developing  country  experience,  and  in their  analysis  the  authors  identify  the ingredients
they  identify  generic  challenges  that  make  it difficult  to  that  show  promise.
organize  extension:  Rural  people  know  when  something  is relevant  and
*  The  magnitude  of the task.  effective.  The  aspects  of agricultural  extension  services
*  Dependence  on wider  policy  and  other  agency  that  tend  to  be inherently  low cost  and  build  reciprocal,
functions.  mutually  trusting  relationships  are those  most  likely  to
Problems  in identifying  the cause  and effect  needed  produce  commitment,  accountability,  political  support,
to enable  accountability  and to get political  support  and  fiscal sustainability,  and the  kinds  of effective  interaction
funding.  that  generate  knowledge.
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Agricultural extension faces great challenges.  inherent in the nature of extension that make its
The agriculture sector needs to nearly double  organization difficult - the magnitude of the
biological yields on existing farm land to meet  task, dependence on wider policy and other
gross food needs that will also double in the  agency functions, problems in tracing cause and
next quarter century. To help meet this  effect, and consequently, difficulties in
challenge, the role of extension is clear - there  obtaining political support for funding,
is a great need for information, ideas, and  accountability, liability to public service
organization.  functions beyond agricultural knowledge and
About 80 percent of the world's  extension is  information transfer, fiscal sustainability, and
publicly funded and delivered by civil servants,  interaction with knowledge generation.
providing a diverse range of services to the  Subsequently, we identify a range of
general population, commercial producers, and  innovations that have emerged in order to
disadvantaged target groups through a variety of  overcome the generic difficulties. These include
approaches. Budgetary constraints and concerns  improving extension management,
about performance are pressuring these services  decentralization, single commodity focus, fee-
to show the payoff to investment in extension  for-service public provision, institutional
and explore alternatives to public provision.  pluralism, empowerment and participatory
This paper analyzes the key challenges facing  approaches, privatization, and interconnecting
policymakers who must decide what role  rural people and the use of appropriate media.
governments should play in implementing or  Analyzing their varying success alone or in
facilitating extension services, and to what  combination, we note the ingredients of those
extent.  approaches that appear most promising to
Our focus is on international, primarily  increase the effectiveness of agricultural
developing country, experience. The core of the  extension.
paper identifies a number of generic challengesI
Extension  - A Dilemma for Policymakers
Challenge for agriculture and rural  Challenge for extension
development  As the world  grapples  with these  issues,
Poverty,  hunger,  economic  growth,  food  agricultural  extension  faces at least two
production,  and natural  resource  degradation  are  challenges:
all great challenges  in today's world.  As the  Information  and organization  in the
global population  climbs  to an expected  8,000  agriculture  sector  must assume  greater
million  by 2025, today  at least 800 million  importance.  People  involved  in agriculture  need
people suffer  from chronic  hunger. Pervasive  improved  skills, information,  and ideas  in order
poverty  will remain  largely  rural, even as urban  to develop  an agriculture  that will meet complex
populations  triple in the same  time period.  demand  patterns,  reduce poverty,  and preserve
Ensuring  a thriving  agricultural  economy  is  or enhance  ecological  resources.  Extension  has
critical for reducing  poverty,  enabling  food  an important  role to play.
security,  and managing  natural  resources  in a  Extension  funding  and delivery  face
sustainable  fashion.  Agriculture  provides a  difficulties  inherent in the extension  mandate:
livelihood  for more  than 60 percent of  *  magnitude  of the task;
developing  country  populations,  and in many  *  dependence  on wider policy and other
countries,  farm  families  make up 80 percent  or  agency  functions;
more of the population  (World  Bank, 1990).  *  problems  establishing  the cause and effect
Agriculture  has already  reached  the limits of  necessary  to obtain  political and financial
land and water,  thus future  increases  in food  support;
production  must exploit biological  yields on  *  liability  for public service  functions  beyond
existing  land (World  Bank, 1997).  In the face of  agricultural  knowledge  and infonnation
this technological  challenge,  agriculture  faces a  transfer;
crisis in many  parts of the developing  world.  In  *  fiscal sustainability;  and
Asia, the growth  rate fostered  by the green  *  interaction  with knowledge  generation.
revolution  has slowed.  In Africa,  per capita  food  Many  observers  are concerned  that public
production  has declined  in most years since  extension  is not doing enough,  not doing  it well,
1970 and is reflected  in recurrent  famine. In  and is not always  relevant.  In developing
many  parts of Latin America  and the Caribbean,  countries,  bureaucratic  inefficiency  and poor
population  pressure  and extensive  agriculture  program  design  and implementation  have  led to
seriously  threaten  the environment  (World  poor performance  and incoherent  links with
Bank, 1990).  And in the industrialized  world,  client  farmers  and the research  sector.  Support
opposition  to high input agriculture  is mounting  for extension  declined  in the 1980s  and donors
in response  to such issues as animal  rights, fears  were unwilling  to fund large-scale  public-sector
of genetically  engineered  products,  and soil and  recurrent  expenditures,  which led to further
water pollution.  underfinancing,  staffing  shortages,  and
contraction  of extension  services  (Amanor  and
Farrington,  1991).
As they seek solutions,  policymakers  must
confront  clashing  views of what extension
1should do, and choose among a number of  regard as inherent in the nature of extension and
extension priorities, products, mandates, and  that make extension services difficult to finance
models. Given fiscal restraint, there is extreme  and deliver. In section IV, we review some of
pressure to demonstrate the payoff to investment  the most important institutional innovations that
in extension and explore alternatives to public  were induced by the challenges faced by
financing by involving the private sector, local  extension, and analyze them within the
authorities, and producer groups.  framework developed in section ElI.  We note the
Section II of this paper defines what we  ingredients of those approaches that appear most
mean by extension and describes the varying  promising for the future of agricultural
roles that governments have historically played.  extension.
Section IN identifies eight challenges that we
2II
Government Investments in Extension
Defining  extension  management, and in negotiating financial,
The term agricultural extension means different  input, and market services.
A system includes all public and private
Anderson, 1997). Van den Ban and Hawkins  institutions that transfer, mobilize, and educate
Ande6)  arson,  1997). Vaconcden  Bn  aend  kions  trural  people, as distinct from a service or single
(1996) arrive at a concept of extension that  inttto  tha  trdtoal  proide  advic
seems to synthesize diverse perspectives into  only (Zijp, 1998).
five goals - transferring knowledge from
researchers to farmers; advising farmers in their
decisionmaking; educating farmers to be able to  Public investment in extension
make similar decisions in future; enabling  Worldwide, agricultural extension employs at
farmers to clarify their own goals and  least 800,000 extension workers and hundreds
possibilities and to realize them; and stimulating  of thousands more farmer technicians or leader
desirable agricultural developments (rural  farmers, reaching about 1,200 million people. 3
guidance). They note that stimulating desirable  Currently, about 80 percent of the world's
agricultural development is the most common  extension services are publicly funded and
goal of extension directors.  delivered by civil servants (World Bank, 1997).
We have reviewed a number of efforts to  Universities, parastatals, and nongovernment
define or characterize extension 2. The context  organizations deliver about 12 percent of
will dictate different rural development,  services, and the private sector another 5
agricultural, and human resource development  percent.
priorities, and hence extension goals and  Government involvement tends to be at
functions. Our view is that it is helpful to see  many levels and in many forms. It may fund,
extension as both a system and the set of  staff, or facilitate extension by establishing
functions performed by that system to induce  conducive regulations and policies for other
voluntary change among rural people.  providers - and it may pursue a range of
A set of functions includes:  purposes. Some of the generic problems of
*  transferring technology in multiple  extension are caused in part by this complexity.
directions for sustainable agricultural  The traditional view of the 'public good' of
production, transformation, and marketing;  many aspects of agricultural knowledge
*  transferring management to mobilize and  diffusion induced most governments to take
organize farming, rural groups, and  exclusive responsibility for extension delivery
communities; and  (Birkhaeuser et al., 1991; Umali-Deininger,
*  transferring capacity to educate, build  1996). Public funding has also been justified for
human resources, and enhance local  many extension programs by social goals such
capacity, for example, in integrated pest  as poverty alleviation and targeting specific
management, market intelligence, farm  groups, including rural women (Wilson, 1991).
2. Albrecht, 1986; Antholt, 1991; Birkhaeuser et al., 1991;
Bunting, 1986; Evenson, 1986; Gustafson, 1991; Purcell
and Anderson, 1997; Roling, 1986; Russell, 1986;
Swanson, 1984; Umali and Schwartz, 1994; World Bank,  3. Based on Swanson et al., 1990, and taking into account
1990.  recent Chinese data reported by Songlin, 1998.
3As recently as 1990, the World Bank (1990)  History
perceived "no substitute (for a large nationwide  Changes and challenges affecting extension are
public extension system) for a corps of well-  symptomatic of wider forces at work in society.
trained and well-supported extension workers  Public policy that affects extension tends to
and subject matter specialists to serve as  parallel development policy, and extension's
competent, motivated, and trusted agents of  institutional evolution reflects what is occurring
change."  in other institutional arenas (Rivera and
Developing-country governments invested  Gustafson, 1991). Major trends and shifts in
heavily in agricultural extension, Beting  extension praxis have been induced by changes
increased agricultural production. Between 1959  in the economic, political, technological,
and 1980, spending in real terms for extension  sociocultural, and fiscal environments for
grew more than six-fold in Latin America,  socionv
tripled in Asia, and more than doubled in Africa  extension.
(World Bank, 1990).  In developing countries, the early colonial
FAO 4 surveyed the current status of  emphasis on commodity programs, many of
agricultural extension in 113 countries,  which still exist today, gave way to broader
contacting 207 agricultural extension  multipurpose rural development efforts, often
organizations that were considered to be  set up by colonial powers that sent expatriate
generally representative of agricultural  'rural agents' to organize communities and serve
extension systems throughout the world  as contact points for government authorities,
(Swanson et al., 1990). Eighty-six percent of  input and credit suppliers, and buying agents.
thesewansonciesal.,re990undedghty-sixmpeis  of  Their broadly defined roles often extended into
these agencies were funded by a ministry of  human health, census taking, and tax collection.
agriculture or similar government agency. Based  Formation of nation states and state-led, planned
on this survey, FAO estimated that in 1988,  Fopmation of  instationalization  of
$6,000 million were spent on public agricultural  development, and the institutionalization of exte0nsiionagencie  werldwide,ersntonpublicnagr  ral  many national extension services occurred in the
extension agencies worldwide, representing an  1  950s. Because agricultural universities were
average expenditure per extension worker of  1950s. Bexise  agricultural  extesion
$8,522. Annual per farmer spending on  bweak  or nonexistent, agricultural extension
extension services ranged from $2 to 3 in low-  became attached to ministries of agriculture, a
income ountrie  to $65in  highincomestructure  that made weak links to research income countries to $65 in high-income  (Axinn, 1988). Confidence in Western
The rate of public investment in agricultural  technology led to the 'diffusion model' of MOA The ate  f  pblicinvstmet  inagrcultral  extension deliver  - a hierarchical,
extension as a percentage of overall MOAs  etnindlvry-hircial extenion  a  a  pecentae  of  veral  MOA5unidirectional  process of technology transfer
resources is directly related to the proportion of  backed by advances in mass media.
the labor force employed in agriculture in  The  by  were in mass media.
different countries. Where less than 20 percent  The 1960s were the era of interpersonal
of the population is employed in agriculture,  communication and community development,
extension receives about 2 percent of ministry  and also the beginning of the green revolution. extesionrecevesabou  2 prcet  ofminitryThe  technolog  transfer orientation was still
resources, compared with slightly more than 20  Tetcnlgy  tase  retto  a  tl percentof  resources where more than 60 percent  strong. From the mid-1970s, public sector
percenthe  pources  in  more.  extension again limited advice to technical
agricultural matters, mainly major annual food
crops, and the multipurpose agents began to be
replaced by systems that focused more closely
on extension and its management (World Bank,
1990). Fifty percent of extension agencies in
FAO' s 1989 survey became organized or
4.  Food  and Agriculture  Organization  of the  United  roaz  from  1970  on
Nations.  reorgamzed from 1970 onward (Swanson et al.,
5. MOA is used throughout this text to denote government  1990). The main features of the 1970s included
Ministries of Agriculture.
4integrated rural development approaches, and  33 percent with an intermediate diploma or
the rise of the training and visit (T&V)  certificate.
extension system. The 'diffusion'  model of
extension gave way to the 'get the technology  Purposes  of public  extension  investments
right'  model, where farm-level constraints  FAO reported that around 58  percent of
explained non-adoption of technology, with a  extension resources were directed toward
prescription to ease the constraints through  commercial farmers, including specialized
integrated packages of services (Axinn, 1988).
The transformative decade of the 1980s  producers of cash and export commodities. The brouhetransincrmative  demphasi  of  participatory  vast majority of smaller, marginal farmers in the
brought an increasing emphasis on participatory  world receive slightly more than one-third of all
approaches. Concemns  with increasing the  extension resources.
productivity of women and preserving  Not all extension is directly related to
ecosystems were added, along with attempted  agricultural knowledge transfer. FAO found that
cost recovery and privatization schemes (World  extension personnel in developing countries
Bank, 1990). Now, the 1990s is the era of  spension  onner  of thelopime  ontries
alternatives where new approaches are being  spend about one-quarter of their time on non-
piloted in an environment of fiscal stringency.  educational activities, representing "about
Democratization has resulted in a dramatic fall  14,0  fultm  eqiaetyasovxeso
in pulcr  sectio p  r.esthdoicalirct  personnel time." FAO regarded this as a "major
in public sector power. Methodologically, direct  loss of educational resources, especially in
farm-level links are stressed between  lossno  conaresoure  especial  in
researchers and farmers. More sustainable  developing countries where extension coverage
approaches to extension funding involve greater  is still grossly inadequate, both in quantitative
flexibility and multiple partners (Gustafson,  and qualitative terms."n
1  991).  In commodity programs, extension workers
1991-  nmay  spend considerable time helping farmers to
Extension  staffing6 acquire inputs, credit, and marketing services. In
contrast, general government extension staff
About 95 percent of extension staff work in  may be engaged in a variety of local government
public agricultural extension systems (Umali  servicing activities, as well as responding to
and Schwartz, 1994), and 90 percent of  information requests, such as crop forecasting
extension workers in the world are located in  and census taking, from extension or ministry
developing countries, over 70 percent in Asia  headquarters.
alone.  Roling (1986) interprets the range of
Extension coverage (the ratio of extension  extension functions in terms of two traditions in
personnel to farmer population) by public  extension - technical innovation (TI), and
extension services in developing countries  human resource development (HRD). From his
varies from 1:1,800 to 1:3,000. Developed  perspective, most of the world's  extension
countries of Europe, North America, and Asia  agencies are engaged in pure TI financed by tax
have ratios averaging about 1:400.  revenues to make the production of food, raw
Although staff numbers are high in many  materials, and export commodities as effective
developing countries, staff quality is often low.  and efficient as possible. The focus of HRD is
Fiscal constraints face managers of public  on rural people themselves and on the social
extension systems, forcing them to hire staff  systems in which they function, and deals with
with few skills to cut operational costs. FAO  such processes as community and leadership
found 40 percent of extension personnel had  development, building institutions, and farmer
only a secondary school education, and another  mobilization and organization.
6. Data cited are from the FAO study by Swanson et al.
(1990), unless stated otherwise.
56III
Generic Challenges Make Extension Difficult
The generic problems of agricultural extension  In Sections I and II, we mentioned the
are bound to its diverse functions, as well as the  800,000 extension agents and their 1,200
bureaucratic, political, and social operating  million clients, many of whom are poor and
environments within which extension systems  have limited resources. The success of extension
operate. We believe that focusing on these  depends on the individual farm management
generic problems - regardless of the  decisions of these millions of people. Many
management system or approach to extension-  populations are widely dispersed and hard to
highlights the areas that should form the agenda  reach (Chambers, 1983). In developing
for future directions in extension.  countries, clients generally have a low level of
literacy and formal education, and live far from
Eight  generic  problems  information sources. They have specific needs
depending on their natural habitat, culture,
exteresar  genericns-  problemspernts  in  thefarming/production  system, and gender (Zijp,
extension functions  -many  aspects of the  1998).
services performed by extension are public  t  i  e  t
goods or toll goods, require collective action,  famer  itu  information  addvce,  th
an  ofe  inovroemn.  edfn  ih  farmers' agricultural  information and advice, the
aendeofte invoblvemgovernment.sWe:defineeight  multiple stakeholders and partners in the
generic problems:  agricultural development effort, and the range in
*  scale  and complexity;  extension mandate. The variety of
*  dependence of extension on the wider policy  communication forms - such as individual
environment and other agency functions;  farm visits, farmer-to-farmer extension, use of
*  inability to trace cause and effect;  mass media, and most recently, computerized
*  commitment and political support;  information technology - adds to the
*  accountability;  complexity facing extension decisionmakers.
*  liability to public service functions beyond  The main manifestation of the magnitude
agricultural knowledge and information  problem is coverage. Many public services are
transfer;  reaching only 10 percent of potential clientele, a
*  operating resources and fiscal sustainability;  minority of which are women. Magnitude
and  interacts with quality of governance and
*  interaction with knowledge generation.  adequate operating resources and technology to
determine coverage and focus (Nagel, 1997).
Scale  and complexity  The most common response to the coverage
problem has been to establish relatively large,
These issues are at the top of the list because in  hierarchical, centralized, public-sector
most respects they represent a 'given'  situation.  structures, with large numbers of extension
The scale and complexity of the extension task  agents widely dispersed in the rural areas, where
can be understood in terms of numbers,  their work is not easily observed or checked.
distribution, and diversity of staff, farmers, and  The top-down managerial style characteristic of
other clients and stakeholders, and in terms of  large bureaucracies tends not to be amenable to
mandate and methodology.  participatory, bottom-up approaches, and the
7many layers in the hierarchy remove  considered adequately, compromising the
decisionmakers from the field action.  usefulness of extension investment.
This exacerbates the often obscured
tendency of extension agents to favor more  Inability to trace cause and effect
responsive clients who are typically better  The difficulty of tracing the relationship
endowed and more capable of undertaking risks  between extension input and its impact is
(Axinn, 1988). Such biases were observed in  another generic issue faced by extension. This
countries as diverse as the Netherlands  Estonia,  difficulty leads to several other inherent
and Tanzania (Zijp, 1988; Chambers, 1983). An  problems, including political support, budget
inherent tension exists between creating a strict  provision, and accountability.
hierarchy capable of managing such a large  Evising  accon'sbiity.
system and being accountable to all strata of  ealuaing  extionshipact  invol
farmers.  ~~~~~~~~~measuring  the relationship between extension fanmers.  activity and changes in:
Depend  eof  extension on the wderpolicy  *  farmer awareness, knowledge, and adoption
Deendiroenceand  other  agency  functions  of particular  technologies  or practices;  and
*  farm productivity and efficiency, and
An inherent problem of agricultural extension,  profitability, input demand, and output
especially in low-income countries, is that it has  supply.
to be combined with other policy instruments to  These same indicators are also influenced
achieve agricultural development (Van den Ban,  by many other factors that have confounding
1986). Thus the effectiveness of extension  effects. In their review of World Bank
investment is highly contingent on relaxing  agricultural research and extension projects,
wider barriers to the successful development of  Purcell and Anderson (1997) observed serious
the agricultural sector as a whole, including  data constraints and inability to include all the
such potentially limiting factors as credit,  contributing variables affecting production
technology stock, input supplies, price  outcomes. Numerous factors contribute to a
incentives, institutions, and human resource  specific production response and to farmers'
constraints (Purcell and Anderson, 1997).  decisions about the use of available resources.
Specifically, institutional frameworks and  Sophisticated econometric studies are
agricultural policies may discriminate against  needed to glean insights into these relationships.
the rural sector, underinvest in technology  Feder and Slade (1986) looked at the problems
development and maintain inappropriate  of observing and measuring changes in
agrarian structures, lock-up arable land in low-  operational efficiency of extension agents, farm
productivity ranching, undervalue and waste  husbandry knowledge, and agricultural
natural resources, underinvest in health and  productivity induced by more intensive systems
education of the rural population, discriminate  introduced by extension. They noted insufficient
against private sector initiatives in food  time-series data to cover the post-project
marketing, and fail to maintain existing or invest  situation, and an inability to compare subject
in new rural infrastructure (World Bank, 1997).  and control areas.
Lack of access to resources and the  Birkhaeuser et al. (1991) note that an ideal
inefficient operation of complementary  simulated experimental framework (before/after
agricultural services thus limit the impact of  and with/without an intervention) is rarely
extension on production. Coordination and links  available. Second-best approaches involve
with complementary agricultural services are  various biases depending on the level of
key problems for extension organizations,  analysis. Farm-level studies are vulnerable to
especially the links with research, input supply  problems of self-selection and the prevalence of
systems, credit, and marketing organizations  inter-farmer communication. Aggregate effects
(Axinn, 1988). Often this dependence is not  of extension measured in a region are subject to
8estimation problems that relate to confounding  providing required services and appropriate
factors.  information;
Axinn (1988) summarizes the  *  accountability of dispersed, relatively
methodological challenge by noting how much  unsupervised field staff to supervisors; and
easier and cheaper it is to monitor inputs than  *  public sector staff accountability to farmers.
outputs. When extension indicators are more  We are primarily interested in the second and
sophisticated and higher level, the cost of  third aspects.
collecting information is also higher, and it is  The third accountability problem arises
more difficult to prove causality between the  especially in the public sector environment of a
selected extension activity and changes in farm  'top-down',  supply-driven extension hierarchy
income or welfare. The inherent problem,  in which agents feel accountable to their
however, is that this is precisely the information  ministry supervisors rather than to farmers.
needed to improve extension effectiveness and  However, because even their supervisors cannot
establish its justification.  easily monitor and evaluate their performance
(because of the difficulty of relating cause and
Commitment and political support  effect), agents become accountable to no one.
Lack of commitment by senior government  On the contrary, rent-seeking opportunities
officials has been cited as a factor adversely  provide a counter incentive for extension agents
affecting implementation and funding support in  to focus on non-extension tasks with more easily
nearly half of World Bank-assisted free-standing  observable results, such as credit and input
extension projects (Purcell and Anderson,  invoicing.
1997). Government failure to allocate necessary  Purcell and Anderson (1997) found
funds to run extension systems is one key  evidence of accountability problems in many
indication of such lack of commitment. Umali-  World Bank extension projects. There was little
Deininger (1996) records how inadequate  attention to the farming community's systematic
recurrent funding inhibits the field operation of  participation in problem definition, problem
World Bank-supported extension projects,  solving, and extension programming. Staff
affecting 87 percent of projects rated as  quality and attitudes were major constraints for
satisfactory and 100 percent of those rated  both farmer contacts and technical support. The
unsatisfactory.  World Bank's  1994 ex-post evaluation of
Roling (1986) relates fiscal problems to  extension projects noted 'entrenched top-down
bargaining power and terms of trade for the  attitudes' in 48 percent of satisfactory projects
agriculture sector. Lack of commitment to  and 75 percent of those ranked unsatisfactory.
agriculture and extension is often fed by urban  Accountability is not just an issue in
bias and poor understanding of rural information  developing countries. Hercus (1991) found that
(Zijp, 1998). Another possible explanation is  agricultural extension services in New Zealand
that there is no immediate payoff to politicians  accounted to government for money spent in
and policymakers for support and commitment  terms of "activities not results, and ...  almost
to extension, because the attribution of  exclusively [in terms of] expenditure and hardly
production results to extension is so  at all with outputs or efficiencies. The mandate
problematic.  of extension was derived by the agricultural
extension service itself, and in the absence of
Accountability  any challenge or alternative definition by the
taxpayers' representatives, the service regarded
Howell (1986) identifies three aspects of  its charter as the right to exist on the prevailing
accountability:  terms and conditions."
*  extension performance in terms of its
effectiveness, impact, or benefit/cost ratio in
9Liability to public service  functions beyond  'big'  farmers dominate farmer groups. Even if
agricultural  knowledge and information  separate agencies are organized, extension must
transfer  still coordinate.
The extension service is often the most widely-
distributed representative of government at the  Operating  resources  and  fiscal sustainability
grass roots level in the rural sector, therefore,  Purcell and Anderson (1997) cite inadequate
there is always the temptation to load it with  public funding to operate services properly as a
more and more functions. Historically, public  common phenomenon in World Bank-assisted
extension has been entrusted with various public  free-standing extension projects, with 76 percent
functions, including collecting statistics,  of projects having an uncertain or unlikely
conducting surveys, writing reports, erosion  sustainability rating. According to Antholt
control, and various regulatory functions such as  (1994), training and visit (T&V) extension
production quotas or pesticide usage. Feder and  systems actually exacerbate operational funding
Slade (1993) note that in many countries the  problems by increasing staffing, and typically
agricultural field service was given a range of  cost 25-40 percent more than multipurpose
additional functions as governments increased  extension (Feder and Slade, 1993).
their role in the rural economy. In rural  The generic problem for extension is the
extension, dissemination of agricultural  inherent difficulty of cost recovery. Much
knowledge is one part of wider government  information disseminated by extension is a
involvement in changing rural attitudes and  'public good', and dissemination costs cannot be
promoting community self-reliance (Oakley,  easily recovered from individuals, thus there is a
1997). The village-level worker is considered by  dependence on direct public funding. Lack of
the government as a relatively low-cost, flexible  political support and commitment arises, as well
administrative instrument to help disadvantaged  as confusion over the 'model controversy'
groups with multifunctional services, gaining  (Rivera, 1991) and the role of the state - is it
wider acceptance in the process.  implementer, organizer, financier, or controller?
We see both 'push'  and 'pull'  factors  Part of the problem is due to magnitude - a
involved in this encroachment on extension  large extension service to serve large numbers
services. The 'push'  is the temptation for other  of farmers with a large staff that is inherently
agencies to use extension because it is the most  expensive to operate. Fixed costs for salaries are
widely distributed apparatus for contact with  high, and operating costs are then treated as a
rural communities. The 'pull' is that agents are  residual, which makes them vulnerable in a
willing to take on other duties, especially input  budget shortage. If a government has to cut the
distribution, because such tasks often increase  operating budget, there are obvious
an extension agent's influence over farmers, as  consequences for effectiveness if extension
well as providing opportunities to extract rents  agents cannot get to the field, causing
which compensate for low salary. The inability  operational as well as morale problems (Axinn,
to relate extension cause and effect makes it  1988).
feasible for field staff to do this.  Howell (1985) sees a cyclical pattern in
Because time spent on noneducational tasks  which extension agencies hired more staff when
reduces potential educational impact by as much  funds were available, but when budgets
as 25 percent (Swanson et al., 1990), the  declined, operating costs were cut. Ameur
assignment of input supply duties to extension  (1994) also sees the problem as a vicious circle
workers tends to be discouraged. Van den Ban  of fiscal difficulty, curtailed services, inefficient
(1986) notes, however, that alternatives to  operation, poorer results, and reduced staff
delivery of these services by extension - such  motivation, training, and competence.
as by the private sector or farmer organizations
- may be problematic if demand is limited or
10Interaction with knowledge generation  scientific papers, and therefore do not generate
Many would argue that the 'bottom line'  of  research relevant to farmers. Extension agents
extension is the quality of its message. Yet  may be more rewarded by distributing inputs
insufficient relevant or new technology  and credit.
necessary to improve productivity is one of the  No pressure. Lack of effectively organized
most common constraints in extension, and a  outside pressure groups, such as national
major constraint in rainfed, resource-poor  policymakers, donors, fanner organizations, or
environments (Axinn, 1988; Anderson and  private companies, may hamper cooperation.
Purcell, 1997). The World Bank's  1994 ex-post
evaluation of extension projects found
inadequate research-extension links to adversely  Interactions
affect a large proportion of the projects
reviewed, and insufficient available technology  The generic problems we have identified cannot
to be an even more common problem.  be seen in isolation from one another. They are
The inherent problem is that extension  interrelated and often represent conflicting
disseminates information and advice generated  imperatives. Pressures may exist to maximize
by a knowledge-generating system which is  coverage while minimizing costs, to emphasize
generally not under extension management. This  firm management control while ensuring
leads to a crucial dependence, which itself is not  bottom-up participation, and to increase human
necessarily a problem. However, research and  resource competence while exploiting the cost-
extension often tend to compete for power and  saving potential of mass media (World Bank,
resources, and fail to see themselves as part of a  1990).
broader agricultural technology system. There is  We have already emphasized some
also a tendency for both extension and research  important causal relationships, in particular the
to look for solutions within national borders,  influence of scale and complexity on size and
whereas relevant information and technology  top-down management of national extension
might be readily available across such artificial  organizations, and the consequences for political
boundaries.  support and the inability to trace cause and
Kaimovitz (1991) identifies the following  effect. Although poorly trained and motivated
obstacles to effective research-extension links:  personnel; lack of qualified, competent, and
Historical perceptions. Policymakers still  trusted staff; and staff quality and low morale
fail to recognize research and extension as  have been described (Antholt, 1994); Axinn,
closely interdependent activities. Extension's  1988; Nagel, 1997), we view such problems as
credibility as a research partner remains  symptomatic of the generic problems that have
damaged by the historical experience. The  been identified.
generally higher status of researchers tends  The interactions can also be related to the
toward patronizing behavior that is resented by  vicious circle of fiscal difficulty, curtailed
extension agents. Both research and extension  services, and inefficient operation noted by
assign a lower priority to linking activities than  Ameur (1994). Kaimovitz (1991) records how
to core activities in allocation of time, resources,  low salaries, limited operating resources, and an
and management attention.  unclear mandate led to a general decline in
Coordination. Resistance to coordination is  morale, and given difficult supervision, lower
perceived as limiting autonomy by both sides.  quality extension work, higher staff turnover,
Goals may differ. The two organizations  and lower credibility. These problems make it
may not share the same goals. The official  more difficult for extension to obtain resources.
mandate may be to provide agricultural  This crisis in extension directly affected
technology to farmers, but in practice,  relations with researchers who, perceiving
researchers may be more interested in producing
11extension as ineffective, became reluctant to  rewarded, there is little incentive to work
cooperate.  harder to reach more, especially resource-
Other significant interactions to note include  poor farmers. Field staff may instead focus
those between:  on larger farmers and high input technology.
'Top-down'  olntation  and (because of  *  Accountability and sustainability. Without
limited farmr  feedback) potential  farmer participation, an extension service
irrelevance of technology generation. If  gains only limited ideas about how willing
biased, it may also distort coverage and  users would be to contribute (Ameur, 1994).
focus, whereby less powerful target groups  *  Lack of operating resources and fiscal
and their crops, and more marginal,  sustainability (as the independent variable),
resource-poor areas are neglected (Axinn,  and coverage, relevance, responsiveness,
1988).  staff morale, and hence accountability, and
*  Inability to trace cause and effect and  (by undermining extension credibility in the
coverage. If extra work is not observed or  eyes of research) knowledge generation.
12IV
Overcoming  Generic Problems
Experience and Promise
A range of institutional innovations emerged as  *  interconnecting rural people and the use of
policymakers have confronted the generic  appropriate media.
problems identified in the previous section.  Figure 1 summarizes our analysis of how the
Over time, however, the emphasis of these  innovations address the generic problems.
innovations has changed. Earlier, the emphasis
was more on communication, then farming  Improving extension management
systems and limiting factors. Later, the emphasis  The importance of improving extension
shifted toward improving the organization and  Thement  is recogni  eltestO
r  . . 1  @  *  ~~~~management  iS recognized  in the latest FAG
management of existing public extension  reference manual on extension (FAO, 1997),.
More recently, attempts to resolve the  The training and visit (T&V) system of
problem of fiscal sustainability have come into  extension is used as an example of improving
focus. Many innovations make use of the notion  management because it is a well-documented,
that not all collective action needs to be  widely-implemented field model of an attempted
thatnorganiz  orleecutedibygoveraconmnensto  aensystematic  and comprehensive improvement in
organized or executed by government agencies.  h  raiainadmngmn  fpbi
Thus, collective action at the community level  the organization and management of public
Thus,mn  datgstatoecm  eei  extension. Other formulations of management has many advantages that overcome generic  principles are plentiful, but their implementation
problems. Furthermore, not all aspects of  has been more piecemeal and less well
extension's role are pure public goods, and thus  documented.
some innovations focus on separating elements  Starting in the late 1960s, T&V has been
that can be privatized and subjected to the  implemented or tried in national systems in at
discipline of the market, thus overcoming the  least 76 countries in all major regions of the
incentive problems inherent in public service  world (Umali and Schwartz, 1994, citing FAO,
delivery.  1990). It was the system employed in 90 percent
of World Bank agricultural extension projects
reviewed by Purcell and Anderson in 1997.
We selected eight innovations and attempted  Kaimovitz  (1991)  interprets  T&V as a response
modifications  for our analysis:  to an historical  crisis  in effectiveness,  credibility,  and
*  improving extension management;  morale  - all results  of the generic  problems -that
*  decentralization;  public  extension  suffered  in the 1960s  and 1970s.  To
*  single commodity focus;  be effective,  the designers  of T&V stressed  that
*  fee-for-service public provision;  certain  key features  had to be preserved  -
. institutional pluralism (mobilizing other  professionalism,  a single line  of command,
players);  concentration  of effort, time-bound  work, field and
•  empowerment and participatory approaches;  farmer orientation,  regular  and continuous  training,
and close  links with research  (Benor  et al., 1984).
*  privatization; and  Over the years, many adaptations have evolved,
13however, the reference here is to the original  institutional innovation.
design, which we view as an induced
Figure  1. Matrix  of  generic  problems  and  innovations.  A l+] indicates  a positive  effect,  [0] indicates  little
or no  effect,  and  [-] indicates  a negative  consequence.  Areas  in the  matrix  left  blank  indicate  inadequate
data  reported  in  the literature  we studied  from  which  to  draw  conclusions.
Innovations  and/or  attempted  modifications,  and  key  ingredients
Improving  extension
management  Decentralization  Single  commodity  focus
Single  line  of  command;  exclusive  Varying  degrees  of  deconcentration Focus  on  a  single  crop,  commodity,
devotion  to  extension  work;  strict  and/or  devolution  of  extension  or  input;  vertical  integration  of
scheduling;  regular,  continuous  program  and  funding  decisions  and  extension  and  complementary
training;  field  &  farmer  orientation;  staff  accountability  to  local  units  functions  throughout  production-
links  with  research  marketing  system;  public,  private,  or
social  sector  organization
Generic  problems
Scale  and  [+-]  larger  organization,  more  [+]  more  municipalities  and  small-  [+] focus  on  a  selected  commodity
complexity,  hence  staff,  higher  staff/farmer  ratio;  but  scale  farmers  reached;  simplified  simplifies  extension  task
coverage  and  focus  low  HRD  skill  in  selecting  contact management  other  crops,  areas  neglected
farmers
[-]  rainfed,  marginal  areas
Dependence  on  [0]  [+]  better  potential  for  integration  with  [+]  through  vertical  integration  of
wider  policy  and  other  local  initiatives  complementary  services
other  agency
functions
Ability  to  trace  [0]  [0]  [+]  through  vertical  integration
cause  and  effect
Commitment  and  [0]  frequently  cited  problem  in  [+]  if local  government  democratic,  but  [+1  powerful  interests  and  lobbies
political  support  World  Bank  project  evaluations  local  interference  more  of  a  problem
Accountability  [+]  tight,  hierarchical  supervision [+]  responsiveness  may  improve  if  [+]  ease  of  structuring  staff
improved  accountability  within  the  local  system  democratic  incentives
service  [-]  if commodity  organization
[-]  inflexible  &  non-participatory  in  interests  diverge  from  farmers'  or
relation  to  clients  society's  interests
Liability  to  other  [+]  increased  focus  on  [-]  Local  govt.  may  be  tempted  to  use  [+]  narrow  commodity  concern
public  service  dissemination  function  extension  agents  for  other  rural
functions  programs
Operating  [-]  significantly  higher  costs  of  [+-]lower  cost  per  beneficiary  but  [+]  through  levies  and  other  cost-
resources  and  increased  staffing,  supervisory  increased  staff  numbers  and  gross  recovery  mechanisms
fiscal  sustainability  visits,  &  training  cost
[-]  uncertain  feasibility  of  local
government  resource  mobilization
Interaction  with  [-]  In  practice  coordination  still  a  [-]  research-extension  links  may  be  [+]  for  the  single  crop
knowledge  problem  more  difficult  for  rest  of  the  farming  system
generation
Other  aspects  Quality  control  more  difficult  Involving  private  and  social  sector
(farmer  organizations)  may  improve
14accountability
Modification  efforts  and  key  ingredients
Empowerment,  farmer  organizing,
Fee-for-service  public  provision Institutional  pluralism:  mobilizing  and  participatory  approaches
other  players
User  charge/fee-based  Unlinked  funding  and  delivery;  Varying  participation  forms,  from
commercialization  of  public  decentralization;  client  stratification;  passive  to  self-mobilized  farmer-to-
extension  service;  farmer  public-private  partnership  &  cost-  farmer  extension  and  organization;
stratification;  often  transition  stage sharing;  contracting  out  to  private  &  decentralization;  range  of
toward  privatization.  nonprofit  sectors;  AKIS;  enabling  participatory  appraisal
MOA  role  methodologies;  extension  agent
training  in  HRD/  group  interaction
methods
Generic  problems
Scale  and  [-]  tendency  for  general  [+]  if mobilizes  NGO  field  presence  [+]  farmer-to-farmer  'networking
complexity  participation  in  extension  to  drop,  effect'  effective  in  reaching  small-
and  poorer,  less  market-oriented  scale  farmers
farmers  to  be  excluded
[+]  if  accompanied  by  stratification
and  "extension  safety  net"
features
Dependence  on
wider  policy  and
other  agency
functions
Ability  to  trace  [+]  if  contracting  process  involves  [+]  farmers  are  the  closest  to  the  real
cause  and  effect  design  of  indicators  with  farmer  situation
involvement,  and  if mobilizes  NGO
participatory  skills
Commitment  and  [-]  may  be  opposition  to  [+-]  farmer  organizations  can
political  support  reclassifying  extension  from  free  mobilize  support;  centralized
to  purchased  good  governments  may  fear  loss  of  control
Accountability  [+]  stronger  client  orientation  and  [+]  if  mobilizes  NGO  responsiveness  [+]  farmer  ownership  and  heightened
more  professional  relationship;  and  HRD  skills;  and  through  provider  trust  and  camraderie  of  participatory
staff  commissions  and  job  competition,  client  orientation,  and  methods;  farmers  may  hire  or
satisfaction  stakeholder  involvement  themselves  serve  as  the  field  agents
Liability  to  other  [+]  Rationalizes  public  sector  role  [+]  farmer  control  ensures  service
public  service  within  broader  range  of  institutions  delivery
functions
Operating  [+]  increased  efficiency  reduces  [+]  Private  and  voluntary  organizations  [+]  Group  approaches  less  staff
resources  and  overheads;  income  from  fees  contribute  resources  and  roles;  may  intensive;  farmer  organizations
fiscal  sustainability  charged;  although  may  be  high  involve  beneficiary  co-payment  mobilize  local  resources;  sustainable
administrative  costs  of  collecting  [-]  costs  associated  with  initial  agriculture  paradigm  is  lower  cost
charges  increased  complexity
Interaction  with  [-]  less  interaction  and  reduced  [+]  if mobilizes  NGO  and  nonprofit  [-]  May  still  be  a  problem
knowledge  feedback  in  the  broader  AKIS  diagnostic  &  feedback  skills
generation
Other  aspects  Positive  outcomes  depend  largely  on  Outcomes  less  positive  in  more
partnership  arrangements  capitalizing  'passive'  forms  of  participation
on  partner  strengths
15Modification  efforts  and  key  ingredients
Interconnecting  rural  people,  and
Privatization  use  of  appropriate  media
Transfer  of  ownership  of  extension  To  enhance  other  innovations,  various
service  to private  entity;  non-public  information/  communication
good-type  information;  support  for  technologies  and  applications,  including
infant  advisory  industries;  public  mass  media;  documentation  and
relations  & media  support;  policy  exchange  of  local  knowledge.
reform;  stakeholder  participation
Generic  problems
Scale  and  complexity  [0]  [+]  if supports  participation,  farmer
organization,  and  efforts  to reach  target
groups
[-]  if reinforces  existing  biases  against
coverage
Dependence  on  wider  policy  [0]  [+]  if helps  strengthen  farmer
and  other  agency  functions  organization  negotiating  ability,  or
reinforce  policy  reform  efforts
Ability  to  trace  cause  and  [+]  potentially,  feedback  through  [-] Feedback  mechanism  more  difficult
effect  improved  private  sector  relationship
with  client  farmers;  concern  for  quality,
efficiency;  imperative  to  provide  data
to  justify  reforms
Commitment  and  political  [0]  initial  resistance  to reforms  from  [0]
support  vested  interests  but,  once  established,
little  dependence  on public  budget
Accountability  [+]  priority  to  farmer-customer  [0]
interests  in  long-term  relationship;
competition;  farmer  representation  on
board
Liability  to other  public  [+]  by  definition  [+-]  Depends  on  how  used.
service  functions
Operating  resources  and  [+]  cost  efficiencies;  mobilization  of  [+]  May  economize  on  cost  of
fiscal  sustainability  private  and  community  resources  to  accessing  information;  mass  media
complement  public  funds  more  cost-effective  than  face-to-face;
self-financing  in the  case  of
telecottages.
[-]  most  IT  applications  involve
significant  initial  investment  and
operating  costs
Interaction  with  knowledge  [+]  Private  entities  have  incentives  to  [+]  If developed  jointly  with  knowledge
generation  link  with  knowledge  generating  generating  agencies
agencies
Other  aspects  Outcome  highly  dependent  on
appropriateness  of use  in conjunction
with  other  efforts.
16T&V attempts to tackle several of the  There remained a tendency to neglect
generic problems identified in section HI. Using  participatory aspects, and accountability to
T&V as a reform tool for the problem of scale,  farmers was not established (Axinn, 1988;
many governments have covered most regions  Nagel, 1997). T&V's most obvious
of their countries with denser extension  disadvantage has been its "highly questionable
agent/farmer ratios by focusing on contact  sustainability" (Antholt, 1994) as a nationwide
farmers who are expected to pass information on  system due to the substantially increased staff
to fellow farners  with similar problems (Nagel,  allocations and recurrent and operational costs
1997). The attempt to cover many farmers,  (Axinn, 1988).
however, led to more dependence on annual
public budget allocations for recurrent costs.  Decentralization
While dependence on external factors and  Decentralization has been described as "the first
other agency functions was not eliminated, the  step on the long road to privatization" because
design called for village extension workers  diversity becomes more tangible and different
(VEWs) to advise farmers on prices, availabilitydiestbcosmreanbladdfeet of  t  neesaryvinptse fands marietonditions,  avasl  y  approaches to extension can be explored as the
of necessary inputs, and market conditions, as  local level becomes accessible (Ameur, 1994).
well as report on actual availability and farmer  Decentralization includes administrative and
responses to supervisors. This would have  political-fiscal devolution of program and
allowed for adjustments to extension  funding decisions and staff accountability to
instructions. Accountability was to be provided  local units. Its impact depends on the extent of
through the tight, line-of-command supervision  political and societal democratization at the
system and the strict timetable of contact farmer  local level. Specifically, the major factors
group visits. Exclusive devotion to information  affecting the effectiveness of decentralization
dissemination tasks relieved staff from the
6push'  and 'pull'  to do tasks that are not related  are:
to agriculture or extension. Finally, T&V  *  the existence of an elected, representative
designers attempted to resolve the problem of  local govemment and a central govemment
interaction with technology generation by  willing to actually decentralize;
structuring research-extension links involving  *  the ability of local government to raise
regular training and continuous feedback of  revenues; and
farmers'  problems.  a  MOA capacity for efficient quality control
In practice, T&V could not escape some  and monitoring (Garfield et al., 1996).
generic problems, and aggravated a couple of  If these requirements are met, various actions
them. The contact farmer coverage method  may be taken and functions decentralized, such
frequently faced problems because contact  as building local capacity for farmer
farmers were not representative of the farming  involvement in extension programming, housing
community (Nagel, 1997). Strict scheduling  extension agents locally and making them
enabled closer checking on what field staff were  responsible to farmers'  associations, and
doing and improved monitoring, but it has not  designing resource mobilization and funding
resolved the problem of relating input to impact.  mechanisms.
The dependence on other rural development  If implemented effectively, and if local
factors could not be eliminated, and the  government is reasonably well funded,
independent status that the extension system  decentralization can transform the top-down
received under T&V initiatives did not help to  structure and operation of a public service
resolve coordination problems with other  bureaucracy, and positively affect several of the
programs.  generic problems of extension. The scale and
In spite of some successes, there were quite  complexity problem is reduced in proportion to
a few countries where T&V has not generated  the number of local government units that take
sustained political support and commitment.  on extension functions in a country, and how
'local'  they are. Extension's dependence on
17other agency functions is reduced because of the  and total costs roughly in proportion to the
potential for better interaction with other local  increase in coverage.
initiatives. Commitment and political support,  Overall, staff numbers have increased by a
along with responsiveness (an aspect of  factor of 3.5, more than doubling the total cost.
accountability) are enhanced if the local  According to Garfield et al. (1996), assuring
government is democratic. To some extent, this  service quality is more complex now that there
circumvents the inability to relate cause and  are more than 1,000 decentralized units.
effect because client satisfaction is in the  Technology generation is cited as another
interest of the locally elected government. On  weakness of the decentralized arrangement.
the other hand, the scope for local political  A recent World Bank-financed agricultural
interference in technical matters is increased.  extension project in Venezuela began with pilot
Experiments in decentralizing public  innovations in decentralization that may
extension services have been carried out in  counteract some of Colombia's potential
several Latin American countries, building on  problems. The pilot activities included
major national decentralization initiatives that  subcontracting a university or NGO 7 to provide
are common in the region (World Bank, 1997).  an extension team in each of the five pilot
Between 1989 and 1993, the government of  municipalities. The main project decentralizes
Colombia decentralized extension to all but 10  planning and implementation of extension to the
of the country's  1,050 municipalities. Each was  municipality level; forms farmers' associations
required to create its own extension office,  to administer the municipal extension service;
Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Tecnica  contracts private extension consultants, NGOs,
Agropecuaria (UMATA), which provides  and universities to manage the extension service
technical assistance to small farmers on a full  provision; and provides for cost-sharing
range of issues. The 1,040 UMATAs employ  between national, state, and municipal levels of
3,500 technical and professional staff, and  government and the beneficiaries themselves.
provide 450,000 small farmers with free  Field visits have confirmed client (farmer)
extension services (28 percent of all small  satisfaction with the service they now receive
farmers in Colombia). Thus far, almost all costs  from extension agents.
are sustained by the central government through
a complex system of budget transfers to  Single commodity-focused  extension
municipalities and matching grants.  Commodity-specific extension has been
To date, the Colombian decentralization has  practiced across the public, parastatal, private
improved coverage (through larger staff inputs)  and social sectors, including by agroprocessing
and possibly responsiveness. The number of  and marketing firms and farmers'  associations
municipalities served is up over 300 percent,  (Nagel, 1997; Umali and Schwartz, 1994). The
while beneficiaries are up over 250 percent,  focus is often on one commercial or export crop
with the beneficiary/technical staff ratio falling  linked to established marketing or processing
17 percent to 129, and cost per fanner  outlets, or on one aspect of farming, such as
diminishing by 10 percent (in line with staff  livestock or dairying (Purcell and Anderson,
increases). Municipality staff are reportedly  1997l Axinn, 1988)d
more accessible to small farmers than staff who  The distinctive feature of commodity-
were formerly under the MOA-directed  specific extension lies in vertically integrating
Colombian Institute for Agriculture and  most of the components of the production and
Livestock (ICA). At least in these early stages,  marketing system, including research, input
however, the decentralization has complicated
staff and program quality control (monitoring
and accountability), exacerbated political
interference at the local level, interrupted  7. We use the term 'NGO'  throughout the text to denote
research-extension links, and increased staffing  nongovernment organizations or private voluntary
organizations.
18supply, product marketing, credit, extension,  interaction of the commodity with other
and sometimes price assurance. It thus deals  components in the smallholder production
most effectively with the generic problem of  system  are neglected (Purcell and Anderson,
dependence on wider policy and other agency  1997). Accountability to farmers is often
functions by internalizing the complementary  questionable unless the commodity organization
services. Complexity and scale are simplified by  is controlled by a farmers' association (Axinn,
a narrow focus on one commodity. As a  1988).
relatively small organization that includes all  Fee-for-service public provision
aspects of the commodity process, this
organizational format to a large extent resolves  Introducng  user charges or fees for services iS
the problem of relating cause and effect. For the  have adopted, primarily as a cost-recovery
same reasons, staff accountability is readily  strategy. Farmers pay a portion of the fees, but
assured by uniform salary, training, and staff  the govemrment  also pays on a contract basis. In
conditions of service.  tegvrmn  lopy  nacnrc  ai.I conditiocs  of  narrvice.  commdityconcrnssome  cases, commercialization is a transitional
The focus on narrow coimodity  concemrs  stage toward privatization. Issues of fiscal
reduces liability to other public service  sustainability and accountability are the primary
functions. The small-and-focused approach is  generic problems addressed by this approach.
relatively cost-effective, and through levies on  Apart from recovering costs from farmer
product sales or by factoring cost-recovery into  clients who can afford to pay for information
product or input prices, fiscal sustainability is  and advice, the fundamental effect of
achieved. Finally, almost by definition the  introducing fees for services, along with
vertically-integrated structure assures a  performance-related staff commissions, is to
Agroprocessing and marketing firms  bring about a more professional, client-oriented
provide extension services to their farmer  relationship between extension agent and
suppliers to reduce input supply risks, reduce  farmer, thus improving both accountability and spost-harvesto  reduces,and  inputpplyro  nis  ,  reduefficiency.  In the New Zealand example
post-harvest losses, and improve quantity,  described below, there is evidence of some
quality, consistency, and timeliness of output. In  positive outcome by integrating extension with
the agroprocessing and marketing operations,  other functions, and tracing cause and effect.
extension services are typically an integral  Positive impact on the scale (coverage) problem
component of contract growing schemes  is only obtained if the introduction of user
involved in producing high-value commodities.  charges is accompanied by stratifying the client
Umali and Schwartz (1994) provide numerous  harket  and arranging special serevices  for less
examples from around the world of the broad  commercial farmers. In the absence of such
range of commodities promoted in this manner.  protection, fee-for-service extension would
They also document many examples of farmers'  likely exacerbate the generic problem of
associations and cooperative commodity  coverage in lower-income countries, and as with
ventures,  most reforms directed toward privatization,
The commodity approach has inherent  present problems of commitment and political
limitations. As Nagel (1977) observes, the  support. Other weaknesses are discussed below.
advantages are largely defined from the  The advisory services of New Zealand and
perspective of the commodity organization.  the UK were both public extension providers
Obviously, in situations where fare ing is not a  that expanded the proportion of their services
monoculture, the approach does not fit as well  available for a fee. New Zealand began cost-
because the narrow commodity focus tends to  averyblefor  a  . New
leave the rest of the agriculture sector and the  Zealand (AgNZ), formerly the ministry advisory
extension system with many unaddressed needs.  service, was sold by the govemrment  to
As a result, scale and coverage, other public  Wrightson's,  a farm service and stock trading
service functions, and issues relating to the
19company, in 1995 (Mavromatis, pers. comm.).  been filled by the creation of a number of
Government contracts and training contribute 50  organizations funded largely through producer
percent, and the balance is derived from  levies.
extension contracts with individual farmers and  Citing Hercus (1991), Rivera and Cary
farmer organizations, research institutes, and  (1997) note that commercialization in New
agribusiness companies.  Zealand, besides reducing the public fiscal
The UK's advisory service, ADAS, initiated  burden, improved accountability and ability to
a system of charges in 1987. It became a more  trace cause and effect by involving extension
autonomous, government-owned agency in  staff in the entire production-processing-
1992, received no government subsidies in  transporting-marketing chain. It also shifted
1996, and as of April 1997, became a private-  toward a stronger client orientation and a
sector company purchased by management and  concern to identify and produce results rather
staff (Griffis, 1996 and pers. comm.). When  than simply to engage in activities.
charges were introduced in 1987, cost recovery  For ADAS, Griffis describes increased
was the objective, with farmers required to  efficiency and reduced cost to government,
contribute to the cost of advice that directly  higher job satisfaction for the majority, more
benefited their businesses. Privatization was not  professional relationships with customers, and
a stated objective at that time, but became one in  better focus. On the negative side in New
1994/95 when it became clear that full cost  Zealand, there remained some concerns about
recovery was possible (Griffis, pers. comm.).  interaction with knowledge generation and
The UK government's  Ministry of Agriculture,  coverage for small farmers. Research agencies
Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) remains the largest  and advisory consulting work became sharpened
customer for ADAS - undertaidng a range of  in focus and efficiency. AgNZ engaged in some
activities concerned with policy development,  specific 'public good' technology transfer
implementation, and monitoring, which includes  projects on a contract basis to commodity
contracted extension.  research agencies and the national Foundation
As the commercialized ADAS looked for  for Research, Science, and Technology. But
other business, its client structure changed,  interaction among organizations diminished and
focusing on farmers willing to pay, and  feedback from farmers to science providers
corporate business clients associated with  declined.
agriculture. Commercial pressures meant that  In the view of Mavromatis, AgNZ's general
less time became available for extension, and  manager, less well-off farmers tended not to
this was soon limited to the activities that  attend field days when AgNZ was a
MAFF required and for which they were willing  government-funded extension service, but today
to pay. As a result, the total number of farmers  farmers are exposed to more diverse opinions.
reached dropped slightly. In the UK context, this  Also in the UK, services to low-income farmers
was not viewed as a significant problem because  have been reduced because some of these
a great deal of information is available to  farmers have not been convinced that benefits
farmers from other sources.  outweigh fees for ADAS services, given the
While no formal assessment of the impact of  availability in the UK of information from other
the New Zealand changes has been undertaken,  sources.
the increased activity of consultants has  Howell (1986) and Rivera and Cary (1997)
improved their performance and job satisfaction  note the limited scope for funding public
(Mavromatis, pers. comm.). Commercialization  extension services by user fees in developing
may also have had a positive overall effect on  countries. Obvious difficulties may be in
coverage through  he_growth  in the number of  collecting user fees, establishing cost-
farm consultants throughout the country.  accounting procedures, and reorienting and
Mavromatis reports that the gap in public good  retraining extension staff (Griffis, pers. comm.).
extension resulting from privatizing AgNZ has
20In primarily subsistence economies, user  coupon schemes, cofinancing, and collaborative
charges for 'common good' general extension  arrangements with NGOs and farmer
information would be difficult to enforce and  organizations.
possibly reduce general participation in  By involving a variety of stakeholders in
extension (Howell, 1986). Umali-Deininger  forging contracts and collaborative partnerships,
(1996) notes that the demand for fee-based  pluralistic arrangements have the potential to
extension services will almost exclusively come  help resolve two fundamental generic problems
from market-oriented farming operations,  - linking cause and effect, and accountability
particularly from areas dominated by medium-  or incentive to deliver quality service. In
to large-scale farmers. Accordingly, she  subcontracting arrangements, the provider's
proposed that partial cost recovery may be a  client orientation is strengthened through the
means of fostering a more demand-driven  contracting process, and the farmer's  influence
system and serving as an important transitional  as a fee-paying customer increases.
phase toward developing a market for fee-for-  Accountability in these arrangements tends to be
service extension. Cost recovery and user co-  multifaceted, with several stakeholders involved
financing components have been incorporated  in developing contract terms of reference,
into World Bank-funded projects in Chile,  competitive bidding, and direct input from
Mexico, and Venezuela, and Nicaragua.  farmers in the design of indicators.
Wilson (1991) describes how cost reduction  The motive behind subcontracting may be to
in Mexico is achieved partly by stratifying the  "get around the institutional inefficiencies
client market by income level, and either  associated with public delivery" (Umali-
progressively graduating higher-income  Deininger, 1997). These usually include various
producers to private extension services or  tenurial problems affecting staff performance
requiring greater cost-sharing. Stratifying for  that apply less in the private sector. Involving
cost recovery reduces both generic fiscal and  nonprofit NGOs may further improve
liability problems, releasing public resources for  responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and equity in
an 'extension safety net' targeted at low- to  coverage.
middle-income producers in priority areas  The difficulty of institutional pluralism is
(Umali-Deininger, 1996).  for central government to adjust to a position of
reduced direct control over either program or
Institutionalpluralism  - staffing. Additionally, financial and
mobilizing other players  adrninistrative management may increase in
Innovations within this category are designed to  complexity, at least initially, as new systems are
create a more pluralistic system of  developed. Additional resources and efforts may
complementary extension services that would  be required to monitor service quality. Where
reach and respond to diverse farmers and  these challenges can be overcome, and where
farming systems (World Bank, 1997). A fine  complementarity can be achieved through
line separates some of these arrangements, such  rationalizing public and private sector roles,
as cofinancing and subcontracting, from fee-for-  mobilizing other players through these
service extension. The emphasis in fee-for-  approaches can resolve the problems of
service extension was (with some exceptions)  coverage, ability to relate cause and effect,
more on cofinancing public provision, while  accountability, fiscal sustainability, and
here the emphasis is on moving more toward  interaction with knowledge generation.
private provision. After discussing the broad  Several principles underpin innovations in
ways in which innovations in this category  this category.  First iS unlinking  public  funding
overcome some generic problems, we offer  from public delivery (Zijp, 1998). Second,
examples of subcontracting arrangements with  pluralism implies changes in governance. New
private sector firms, including voucher and  institutions and institutional arrangements, such
as public-private partnerships, are involved. A
21key governance principle is to open and  MOA which individual farmers should graduate
democratize extension control so that all  from the program.
stakeholders may express their perspectives and  There is still insufficient information to
interests, and play appropriate roles in extension  judge whether these coupon and voucher
design, implementation, and evaluation.  systems entail significant costs. Experience of
Third, with pluralism the government  voucher systems in the education field (West,
recognizes that to meet diverse needs and  1996) suggests that administrative costs might
conditions in the farming sector, it should invest  be substantial, threatening the sustainability of
more broadly in the whole agricultural  the voucher system as a whole.
knowledge and information system (AKIS),  Cofinancing in Ecuador and Honduras aims
rather than in public sector extension services  to replace the public extension services with a
alone. Implied in each of the above principles  'technology transfer market' financed jointly by
are significant role changes for ministries of  government and the beneficiaries, in which
agriculture as they move away from service  private agents will compete to provide services.
delivery toward providing an enabling policy  Both cases involve stratification of farmers into
environment, coordinating and facilitating the  small-scale producers and medium- and large-
work of other players, and assisting farmers in  scale producers, with separate programs and
negotiating terms of contracts, monitoring  graduated scales of copayment designed for
quality, and exercising financial control.  each farmer category.
Recognizing that complete privatization of  Collaborative arrangements with the NGO
agricultural extension services is often not  and nonprofit sector include cooperative
feasible, several Latin American countries are  arrangements with universities, commodity
attempting to address such problems as fiscal  boards, and commodity foundations (Umali and
sustainability and poor client orientation by  Schwartz, 1994; Nagel,  1997). Non-government
integrating the private sector into extension  organizations represent a highly prevalent
systems (Umali-Deininger, 1996). Contracting  partner in agricultural extension in developing
only specific functions, for example staff  countries, frequently focusing on areas
training and video production, is one alternative,  inadequately served by the government. Many
as in Morocco. More comprehensive  NGOs strive to be participatory, democratic,
subcontracting of extension services has been  responsive, cost-effective, community-based,
attempted in countries as diverse as Estonia,  and focused on the needs of hard-to-reach target
Turkey, Madagascar, Costa Rica, and Mexico.  groups.
Coupons attached to agricultural bank loans,  However, NGOs do not always live up to
committing a certain percentage of the loan for  their articles of faith. Some NGOs push their
extension services, have been used in Colombia  own agenda and are more accountable to
(Rivera and Cary, 1997). Extension vouchers  external funding sources than to the clientele
are a subcontracting innovation launched in  they aim to serve (Farrington, 1997). Hence,
Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua,  care must be exercised to ensure that partnership
farmers issued with vouchers were able to  arrangements with NGOs capitalize on their
choose their extension supplier, either public or  strengths and avoid their weaknesses.
private (Umali-Deininger 1996). The
government retains a role not only in financing,  Empowerment  and participatory approaches
but also in regulating extension providers. In  Evolving control by beneficiaries may be the
Costa Rica, vouchers vary according to the types  single most important initiative to make
of farmers and levels of technology requiring  extension accountable to clients for
high- or low-intenslty technical assistance. At
project completion, beneficiaries are expected to  perfon  ankeytgene  wAness  of
continue with solely private technical assistance.  eesin  on  ions  tho  1994).
The private extensionist is to indicate to the
22emanating from inability to trace cause and  backgrounds, including women, who are able to
effect. We have already alluded to farmers'  perform many extension agent roles in a cost
groups as beneficiary organizations required by  effective manner (Axinn, 1988; Russell, 1986).
some decentralized, cost-recovery,  Participatory approaches have been found to
subcontracting, and cofinancing arrangements.  adjust complementary services more closely to
Farmer organizing is a key element in the client-  farmer needs (Axinn, 1988), as well as reduce
based extension strategies of NGOs (Nagel,  farmer dependence on external inputs (Roling
1997). We also mentioned in a previous  and Pretty, 1997).
subsection that farmers' associations organized  Farmers' union formation in Europe
on commodity lines actually provide extension  improved the integration of complementary
services to their members (Umali-Deininger,  services and raised political support (Roling,
1996). Some of these commodity-based farmers'  1986)8.  Participatory approaches also have a
organizations have been highly successful, for  positive effect in terms of tracing cause and
instance in the dairy industry in India (Chamala  effect through farmer-led experimentation and
and Shingi, 1997).  analysis, and farmer feedback (Axinn, 1988). A
A wealth of experience and lessons on  key positive impact of participation is
participation and farmer control testifies to  accountability. Axinn goes as far as to state that
potentially positive effects on generic problems.  'automatic quality control' is achieved through
However, their impact depends where on the  raising farmer awareness and confidence. The
'participatory continuum'  a particular initiative  quality of trust established (Pretty and Volouhe,
lies. Pretty and Volouhe (1997) reviewed the  1997) and ownership (Chamala and Shingi,
rapid/participatory rural appraisal field, citing  1997) are also emphasized.
no less than 30 different terms and names for  Fiscal sustainability is improved through
alternative systems of participatory learning and  mobilizing local resources. Cost-effectiveness
action that have sprung up over the last decade  and efficiency are achieved by using relevant
or so. Many of these involve 'self-mobilizing'  methods that focus on expressed farmer needs
methods - in group and team dynamics,  and local people taking over many extension
sampling, interviewing and dialogue, and  roles (Axinn, 1988). Participation has positive
visualization and diagramming.  effects on the interaction with knowledge
It is clear from examples they give that the  generation by combining indigenous knowledge
conscious use of these methods, which pay great  with feedback into the agricultural knowledge
attention to monitoring and self-evaluation, has  system (Axinn, 1988; Chamala and Shingi,
a significant impact in raising the level of trust,  1997), and identifying and verifying applicable
understanding, and links among the various  technology and technology generation needs for
actors and agencies involved in a rural situation,  farming systems (Purcell and Anderson, 1997).
with the farmers at the center of the process.  France, Norway, and Taiwan provide
Chamala and Shingi (1997) review lessons  examples of the prominent role farmers'
learned in establishing and strengthening farmer  organizations can play in funding and
organizations, confirming valid extension roles  organizing agricultural extension (see Ameur,
in farmer empowerment, community organizing,  1994; Umali and Schwartz, 1994; Haug, 1991;
human resource development, and problem  Nagel, 1997).
solving and education. Axinn's  analysis of the  In Taiwan, 90 percent of the country's
'participatory approach' also notes its  farmers belong to farmers' associations
advantages and disadvantages (1988).
Participatory approaches have positive
effects for most of the generic problems of
extension. On the problem of scale and  8. In the Netherlands, 95 percent of farrners operate within provincial organizations linked to national and even
coverage, participatory approaches produce  European farming unions, and are able to exercise
farmer leaders with appropriate local  substantial influence on agricultural policies and hold
extension accountable.
23organized at township, county, and provincial  countries with a large base of small-scale,
levels (Nagel, 1997), with an overall extension  subsistence farmers (Umali-Deininger, 1996). In
policy defined by the government that includes  such circumstances, public sector finance
strong, institutionalized links with research and  remains essential, mixed with various cost-
other services. Extension is carried out by  recovery, cofinancing, and other transitional
agents employed by the farmers' associations at  institutional arrangements that are appropriate to
the township level and financed largely by the  the pace of structural and commercial changes
farmers themselves. In Argentina, the farmer  in agriculture.
group movement CREA (Agricultural  If privatization is appropriate, some generic
Experimentation Regional Consortia) has spread  problems will be positively affected. All
to Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It  privatization efforts report improvements in
exemplifies fully self-supporting extension  accountability, usually expressed in terms of
organized by farmers (Tobar, 1996).  client orientation and satisfaction (thus avoiding
Not all participatory attempts produce a  the cause and effect problem). Obviously,
wholly positive experience. Often  private sector initiatives are not affected by
decentralization is virtually a prerequisite for  other public service liabilities. All privatized
effective local participation. On the other hand,  efforts claim improved efficiency, cost-
in conventional agriculture with more passive  effectiveness, and reduced public sector costs by
forms of participation, there is a risk that the  servicing the needs of farmer clients who can
elite will capture delivered benefits (Howell,  afford to pay for the information, thus
1986).  overcoming the problems of sustainability and
dependence on fiscal allocations. Incentives
Privatization  exist for private providers of extension to
Use of the term privatization often tends to be  maintain close links with knowledge generation
misleading. In its pure sense, privatization  agencies in order to have a marketable product.
implies full transfer of ownership (usually by  For other generic problems, the impact of
way of sale) from government to a private  privatizing extension is mixed. Overreliance on
entity, with that entity meeting all costs and  private extension risks neglect of less
receiving any profits (Rivera and Cary, 1997). In  commercial farmers and lower-value crops.
most cases, governments have not actually  Stratificaton  and separate, publicly-funded
privatized their agricultural extension services  targeted programs are needed to counter this
in this sense.  risk. Privatization also does not deal with the
The private sector has the incentive to  complexity of providing a socially and
provide private and toll-good information to  environmentally optimal service.
'better-off'  commercial farmers and members of  Most analysts suggest a cautious,
private associations for whom extension service  evolutionary approach toward privatization
delivery is profitable. In areas dominated by  within a clearly formulated mission and
commercial farming and farmers with  strategy, along with open communication among
marketable output, it makes sense to mobilize  all stakeholders. Privatization may start with
the private sector to provide investment capital  more commercial farmers for whom technology
and serivices  (World Bank, 1997). Input  packages already exist and extension is largely a
suppliers have strong incentives to provide  delivery function. It may begin in a single region
advice on a range of crop and livestock  and expand over time, bnnging farmers to the
activities. With the increased commercialization  point where their future extension needs can be
of agriculture in many developing countries, this  met by private-sector services or provided on a
source of technical knowledge may assume a  fee-paying basis, leaving the public service to
much more prominent role. Fully privatized  serve new clientele and cropping systems,
extension is not econonically  feasible in  including more marginal groups (World Bank,
1990). Below we describe a few cases where
24governments have privatized all or part of their  consulting firms to contribute up to 30 percent
extension services, usually in stages. There are  of the cost of the program. The government
plenty of other instances where private entities  agency prepares terms of reference for the
have found it profitable to provide extension  contracts. A recent program for medium- and
services.  large-scale farmers in Chile is now totally
Chile completely privatized its extension  privately funded and executed by the National
system in the 1970s, forcing commercial  Agriculture Society.
producers to obtain extension services from  In the Netherlands, the government is half-
privately-owned consulting firms (Umali-  way through a 10-year phased privatization
Deininger, 1996), and has since been taking  process in which its public extension service,
steps to rationalize services for different farmer  DLV, became a foundation with farmers'
categories. While the large commercial farmers  organizations and the government equally
were not seriously affected by the shift to full  represented on the board (Rivera and Cary,
private-sector delivery, small-scale and  1997). In December 1997, agreement was
subsistence farmers were left out of the  reached with the Dutch government that all
extension market.  direct bilateral financial contracts with DLV
As a result, the Chilean government had to  would terminate after three more years. 9 From
actively target extension services to groups with  2000 onwards, government contracts for
smaller marketable output. Two target groups  extension programs will be tendered in the open
were identified and served by specially designed  market with competition among all parties
programs with World Bank assistance. One  interested in carrying out the programs. The
subgroup of farmers considered to have  foundation will then change into a stock
sufficient resources to eventually attain self-  company with shares held by employees, and
sufficiency and market surplus production  temporarily, by the MOA.
received a producer-oriented extension package  In some respects, the Dutch privatization
through a special program. This beneficiary  was an upheaval. Tacken (1996) records how 50
group paid 15 percent of extension costs, a rate  percent of DLV's  original staff had to be fired
which may reach 50 percent. The second  or take early retirement in a process
subgroup of poorer, subsistence farmers  characterized by considerable tension as DLV
received a more farm family-oriented, 'basic'  changed its organizational culture.
service for free, with a proposed eventual  Tacken reports a number of positive effects
contribution of 15 percent of total costs.  of the privatization, including a 50 percent
Services for both programs were delivered  reduction in overhead. Client satisfaction
by contracted private consulting firms. Wilson  jumped 40 percent in three years, attributed to
(1991) notes the goal is to increase commercial  improved client orientation, quality control, and
and family farm contributions, and that the  more specialization of advice. Extension
overall Chilean cost reduction principle is to  programs before privatization were closely
target free services, limit the period of coverage  related to national policy goals, often conflicted
to general recipients, and work with groups to  with farmers' interests, had low impact, and led
reduce costs. To qualify for the Chilean  to conflicting roles, low morale and turnover of
program, a firm must meet technical and  extension staff and lack of farmer confidence.
professional staffing criteria, bid for contracts,  The service was neither needs-driven nor
and agree to have its activities supervised and  problem-oriented, and overused mass media for
evaluated by a designated public agency.  delivery. After privatization, farmer interests
Ameur (1994) reports that these programs  became a priority as farmers became strongly
reach a large number of small-scale farmers, the  represented on the DLV board and sectoral
typical farner/agent  ratio is as low as 48 to 1,
consulting firms focus only on technology
transfer, and farmers contract with their
9. Personal communication, May 1998.
25councils. Staff attitudes on efficiency,  Taiwan. In Brazil around 1988, there were over
effectiveness, and job satisfaction improved as  2,000 private consulting firms largely catering
DLV monitored individual performance.  to the specialized needs of the commercial
Albania is another recent case where  livestock sector. In Asia, consulting firms tend
privatization has been attempted on a national  to concentrate on plantation crops, often staffed
scale. With World Bank assistance, the  by ex-plantation managers and technicians.
government created a nationwide competitive
private-sector network of 300 dealers to deliver  Interconnecting  rural people and using
inputs and technology to 600,000 newly  appropriate media
established, small-scale private farmers (Schultz  The arrival of the information age has naturally
et al., 1996). The initiative explicitly tackled the  led to an interest in its potential for innovative
generic problem of dependence on wider policy  applications of the latest information
and other agency functions because the  technologies (IT) to enhance extension delivery.
government implemented policies in a  Considering appropriate media for extension
consistent and coordinated manner to support  also includes the place of more traditional
private-sector development. In addition, a private-sector tradevassocint.In (AFadAi and  extension methods, such as mass media, group
ptevatelbanian  FarerssUnion  it sponsord  meetings, field days, demonstrations, and
theAlbniaFanerUnont  sponexchange visits (Campbell and Barker, 1997).
lobbied the government to reduce import duties  Innovations in this category are most
and remove a value-added tax on fertilizer.
The reormedMOA  rle  becme  enirelydirectly  associated with overcoming the generic The reformed MOA role became entirely .. . . ~~~~problems  of scale and complexity and  - related to supporting policies, services, and fair  trough  osciencociatd
rules.  fo  coptto  in th.natpivtetr  through cost-efficiencies associated with certain rules for competition in the infanttrvt  eco,  mspmda-fsclssanvabltyeto,.  In Abna
including an information base, weekly market  mas  mei  iclssanaiiy  nAbna
pincludinge  a  informationatnd  reabase, wekculy  l  mart  the privatization effort described above involved
price information,eand  prelblem  agpricultura  data.extensive  use of mass media (television, radio,
The other generic problem improved by  adawdl-icltdmnhyarbsns
privatization was accountability through the  and a widely-circulated monthly agribusiness
long-term relationships private dealer firms  newsletter) to inform, create public awareness,
create with customers. To overcome the generic  and change attitudes. This media effort
problem of political co-mitment,  a direct  supporting the reformed MOA role helped to
approach to the private sector (that bypassed  overcome the generic problem of dependence on
vested power and rent-seeking interests which  wider policy. In a study by Wete (1991), the most
delayed and disrupted the reform process) was  Inal  aproc  - prin  withe  gpsa
required. The generic problem of interaction  radioe  s  t  appro  prate  and
with knowledge generation remained a problem.  radio -emerges  as most appropriate and cost-
wihulth  knowedge  generati  remained  al  proble  effective in a developing country. Zijp's  (1994)
Schultz et al. (1996) record that although
privatization facilitated transfer and adoption of  study provides numerous examples of cost-
effective use of different IT applications. Their technology, reduced government funding also  poitv  imat.oee,ismtmsahee
created competition rather than cooperation  . . . i
within the knowledge system, hampering  only at a significant initial and operating cost.
communication with research, education, farmer  Further, this impact tends to occur when the
media are used in combination with other
organizations, private consultants, and suppliers.  inoaosthtwhveriwd,nicig . m~~~~inovations  that we have reviewed, indicating
Finally, as we have mentioned, farmers'  that IT is best considered not in isolation, but as
associations, often along commodity lines,  a 'force multiplier' enabling or enhancing the
provide their own private extension services to
members.  ~  Uml-enne  (19)Also  effectiveness of other innovations and
members UmaliDeiningr  (199)  alsoconventional  extension methods (Antholt,
documents the role of private consulting firms  conventoaliextion  metho  (AnthofT,
providing extension services in Argentina,  1994). Generallzatlon about the effect of IT on
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Korea, and
26range of media that may be considered for  information, educational, and organizational
different extension purposes.  needs of the community.
AED (1985) found the suitability of  In Sweden, 50 telecottages became
different media dependent upon the message,  operational within five years after the first one
target audience, and social environment. Radio  opened in 1985. Their aim is to counteract
and television are more appropriate for reaching  geographical disadvantages, and provide
many people quickly with relatively simple  isolated villages with access to databases, data
ideas, while print media are better suited to  processing, fax, e-mail, computer-assisted
provide timely reminders of information.  services, open university and on-line tutorials,
Interpersonal communication, including  and village hall facilities.
extension agents, group meetings, and  Wete (1991) pointed out some limitations:
demonstrations are best suited for teaching and  *  information alone is an insufficient
enhancing credibility of information. Based on  condition for social change;
Lionberger's  (1968) model of the adoption  *  far from being neutral, provision of
process, Campbell and Barker recommend:  information can actually widen the gap
*  mass media and popular theater to provide  between rich and poor;
new or additional information in the  *  communications technology (CT) does not
'awareness'  stage;  have produce effects without government
*  group meetings, radio, and field days to  commitment to change, reflected in its
increase knowledge in the 'interest'  stage;  provision of budgetary support and
*  result and method demonstrations, and  conducive policy and complementary
farmer exchange to improve skills in the  services; and
'evaluation'  stage;  *  most developing countries cannot afford CT
e  individual visits, farmer exchange, on-farm  hardware costs; as a result, the benefit/cost
trials, and method demonstrations to induce  ratio of some CT applications is doubtful.
behavioral change in the 'trial'  stage; and  In overcoming generic problems, the
i  recognition programs, competitions, and  limitations of IT/CT have much to do with
incorporating practices into farming systems  innovations in this category not standing alone.
to consolidate attitudinal change in the  Thus, by itself, IT cannot overcome the problem
'adoption'  stage.  of relating cause and effect. The principle of
'Interconnectivity' describes the use of  'garbage in, garbage out'  applies, and care must
appropriate information and communications  be taken that the overzealous use of IT does not
technology (IT) to enable people to connect with  give biased or inaccurate information an aura of
other people (Zijp, 1997). To harness its full  veracity. In terms of coverage, IT cannot replace
potential requires considerable commitment and  face-to-face contact between extension agents
some radical changes in perspective. One  and farmers. Also, there are tendencies toward
change is to lessen our reductionist, sectoral  urban and other biases (for example, against the
orientation in favor of a pluralist, cross-sectoral,  disadvantaged and traditional culture) in some
systems perspective. Thus, interconnectivity is  IT applications.
closely interrelated to decentralization and  Nevertheless, increased investments in
institutional pluralism. Community  many IT applications appear to make sound
communication centers, or telecottages,  economic and social sense, and deserve public
exemplify the new partnerships emerging for  sector support (Zijp, 1997).
local information access, communication, and
education in rural areas. They are as diverse as  Interpretation  and  conclusions
the communities they serve, but many are self-  In designing extension, an approach is less
financing after initial start-up, and they all shift  important than its ingredients. Using the
control and accountability to focus on the  framework developed above, it is important to
27isolate ingredients of success and find ways to  release public funds to serve smaller-scale
replicate or transfer these characteristics to  farmers. Conversely, increased coverage by
improve the performance of another approach.  enlarging the MOA and attempting to improve
A familiar example is to explore ways of  the management of its general services is not
integrating positive characteristics of private-  sustainable in the long run.
sector or NGO operations into public-sector  Not surprisingly, moving to the right in row
management. A less familiar example, but one  7 of the matrix (Fig. 1), the generic problem of
which springs from this framework, is to explore  funding begins to look more positive - the
modifications to the vertical integration feature  matrix is arranged in the direction of public to
that contributes to the success of the commodity  private.
approach.  Innovations that resolve the generic
This implies broadening the historical  problems of scale, dependence on other policies
tendency of extension to focus on production,  and services, and inability to trace cause and
and pay more attention to transformation and  effect tend to resolve several other generic
marketing. Perhaps most important would be to  problems as well. Here, we notice some
integrate farmer participation and control into  significant findings. The conventional wisdom
other extension modifications and a means to  of the past has tended to look to massive,
overcome several critical generic problems of  technocratic, and sophisticated efforts - in
scale and complexity, relating cause and effect,  management and media -to  seek impact in
and accountability. This requires  proportion to the perceived scale and
decentralization, and is even more effective  complexity of these problems.
when institutional pluralism is built in.  In contrast, we notice that the most
Looking across the rows of the matrix in  significant effect on these three problem areas
Figure 1, we can assess which innovations,  involves concepts and practices falling broadly
alone or in combination, offer solutions to a  within the approach of sustainable agriculture.
given generic problem or set of interrelated  Without a full discussion, its advocates 10 believe
problems, and whether a gain in overcoming one  that a sustainable approach - low external
problem is to be had at the expense of another  inputs, a systems orientation, pluralism, and
problem. In some instances, care is required to  reliance on arrangements that use the incentives
avoid a potential pitfall and achieve a positive  of both farmers and those who serve them-
trade-off between the pros and cons inherent in  releases the local knowledge, organizing ability,
an approach. To a large extent, our framework  resources, and commonsense of rural people to
confirms most current professional wisdom.  overcome policy constraints.
For example, impact on the coverage  Rural people know when what is being done
problem is most powerful through participation  is relevant and effective. The ingredients of a
and control by farmer organizations, mobilizing  sustainable approach tend to be inherently low
other players (e.g., NGOs), and using  cost and build relationships of mutual trust and
appropriate media. These ingredients involve  reciprocity. From these relationships,
using local people as field agents who belong to  commitment, political support, accountability,
target groups, training extension workers in  fiscal sustainability, and effective interaction
human resource development skills, and  with knowledge generation develop.
collaborating with community organizations and
their support groups to help them use their own
systems of knowledge, experimentation, and
communication.
Impact on coverage can also be obtained by
prioritizing, categorizing, and stratifying farmers
into target groups, using cost-recovery schemes  10. Such  as Roling  and Pretty  (1997),  Axinn  (1988),
with more comnmercially-oriented  farmers to  Antholt  (1994),  Rivera  (1991),  Haverkort  and de Zeeuw
(1991).
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